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SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
plaintiff found the parking lot "closed" and her automobile gone.
The court's decision was for the plaintiff. It was held that a
contract of bailment had been entered into under which the bailee
assumed an obligation to exercise ordinary care in protecting
plaintiff's automobile. It was further held that since the intended
limitations on the bailee's responsibility were not brought "clearly
and specifically" to the bailor's attention, the obligation on the
part of the bailee to use ordinary care did not terminate at 6 p.m.
The principal cases follow the general rule.'" They empha.
size judicial insistence upon actual notice of terms proposed by
the bailee and assent either expressed or implied by the bailor
before an intended limitation upon the bailee's liability will be
recognized as a contractual term of the bailment contract.
D. Carl Richards.
PUBLIC CONTROL OF BUSINESS
MINIMUM PRICE FIXING FOR THE LIQUOR INDUSTRY
Arkansas. A recent decision in this field raises the question as
to what extent a state legislature may discriminate against ordi-
nary business under the avowed purpose of regulating a business
which exists as a mere privilege.
In May, 1950, the Supreme Court of Arkansas, over a forceful
dissent, held that liquor price-fixing by the Legislature was a valid
exercise of the police power. In the case of Gipson v. Morely' a
liquor control law2 was tested which contained the following pro-
visions: (1) It fixed both wholesale and retail prices; the former
were set at wholesaler's cost plus 15 per cent, and the latter was
fixed at retailer's cost plus 33 1/3 per cent. (2) A tax on liquor
was laid, proceeds to go into a special fund. (3) From this fund
an appropriation was made to hire 20 employees in the office of
10 BROWN, LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY (1936) § 84.
1 ---.-.------.Ark ..-.......... 233 S. W. 2d 79 (1950). Justice McFaddin wrote a dissenting
opinion, in which the Chief Justice concurred.
2Ark. Acts 1949, No. 282.
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the Commissioner of Revenues to enforce this and other liquor
laws.
The principal argument that the measure was unconstitutional
was directed at the first provision. Plaintiff, a citizen and tax-
payer, in his suit to enjoin the Commissioner of Revenues and
the State Treasurer from enforcing or paying out funds to enforce
the act, sought to invoke the following provisions of the Constitu-
tion of Arkansas:
"The General Assembly shall not grant to any citizen or class of
citizens privileges or immunities which upon the same terms shall not
equally belong to all citizens." 3
"Perpetuities and monopolies are contrary to the genius of a re-
public, and shall not be allowed. ... "4
The plaintiff asserted that the act was unconstitutional in that it
conferred a special privilege of profit-making upon liquor dealers
-a privilege not conferred upon the rest of the population.
The attack was novel. The typical challenge of police power
regulations is brought by the one who is regulated, and is based
upon a charge that the rule violates a due process or equal pro-
tection clause, often of the Federal Constitution. Here, a non-
regulated party brought the action, and relied upon a clause in
the state constitutions rarely invoked in such cases.
In sustaining the legislation, the majority clearly indicated that
even if the act did guarantee a gross profit to those who choose to
gain a livelihood through the sale of liquor, such result was within
the permissible discretion of the General Assembly. This view was
3Art. II, § 18.
4 Art. II, § 19.
5Typical of such clauses are the following:
(a) "The Legislature shall not pass any local or special law.., granting to any
corporation, association or individual any special or exclusive right, privilege
or immunity." LA. CONST. Art. 4, § 4.
(b) "The Legislature shall not grant to any corporation or person, any.'.. priv-
ileges ... which shall not, upon the same terms and under like conditions,
inure equally to all persons." N. M. CONST. Art. 4, § 26.
(c) "The Legislature shall pass no law granting any association, corporation, or
individual any exclusive rights, privileges, or immunities within this state."
OKLA. CONST. Art. V, § 51.
(d) ". .. [N]o man, or set of men is entitled to exclusive separate public emolu-
ments, or privileges, but in consideration of 'public services." TEX. CONST.
Art. I, § 3.
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opposed by the minority on the ground that insofar as the act pre-
scribed a minimum price, the resulting gross profit to the liquor
dealer violated the constitutional restriction against grants of
privileges.In support of its decision, the majority relied upon that body
of law' which treats the liquor business as a mere privilege and
subject to total regulation by the state, as contrasted with ordinary
businesses or professions, such as those of the barber or baker,
which are of common right and subject only to limited regulation.
Thus, the court distinguished its previous holding in Noble v.
Davis,7 the only occasion where it had passed upon the validity
of a price-fixing statute. In that case an enactment which author-
ized minimum price schedules for barbers was held unconstitu-
tional. There the decision was put upon the ground that the busi-
ness of the barber is one of common right, and that prices charged
for shaves and haircuts have no such effect upon the public peace,
health, safety and welfare as to justify a minimum price statute.
The court held Noble v. Davis inapplicable to the principal case
because the statute in question regulated a business not of common
right. The court said:
"... [F] rom the earliest days of liquor regulation our laws, now
admittedly valid, have granted a special privilege to liquor dealers
much more far-reaching, more monopolistic, than any thing contained
in Act 282. This is the license to engage in the liquor business to the
exclusion of unlicensed sellers. This is a 'special privilege' of which
bootleggers have traditionally complained, and one which gives to
liquor dealers a substantial assurance of net profit that is not given
to other law-abiding citizens. Yet the courts of Arkansas, like those
of all American states, have sustained these monopolistic grants of
special privilege on the ground that it is within the competency of the
legislature to determine under the police power what regulatory rules
are needful in controlling a type of business fraught with perils to
public peace, health and safety as is the liquor business."
6 See 30 AM. JuR., Intoxicating Liquor, §§ 22, 277, pp. 266, 399; 16 C. J. S., Con-
stitutional Law, § 469, p. 931 ; 48 C. J. S., Intoxicating Liquor, § 33, p. 165; 169 A. L. R.
1190 (1947); 172 A. L. R. 608 (1948).
7204 Ark. 156, 161 S. W. 2d 189 (1942).
8 233 S. W. 2d at 83.
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However well established this principle may be, it goes only to
explain why the state by its licensing procedure may grant or
withhold the privilege of selling liquor, and regulate it even to the
point of extinction. It does not explain why in the process of regu-
lating the liquor traffic the Legislature should be allowed to go fur-
ther and set up a gross profit, which, according to the contention
made in this case, amounts to a privilege in violation of the con-
stitution. That is to say, while this principle may suffice to justify
burdens or restrictions running to the disadvantage of the liquor
dealer, it does not explain why he should receive a guaranteed
gross profit, running, perhaps, to the disadvantage of the barber,
who has failed to get a floor put under his prices. The relation a
guaranteed gross profit bears to the problem of policing is distant
indeed.
The majority opinion states that "unlawful sales to minors and
drunkards, the offering of free samples, the effort to increase sales
by cutting prices ... are among the evils against which our legisla-
tion seeks to guard."' In order to halt these evils may the legisla-
ture insure liquor dealers a gross profit in the face of constitu-
tional restrictions against a grant of special privilege? If so, the
statutory measure must be reasonably related to a proper legisla-
tive purpose in protection of public health, safety, morals or gen-
eral welfare."0 Yet appearing first in order in the recital of legis-
lative policy in Section 1 of the act in question is the declared
purpose "of avoiding price wars which would materially afect the
revenues of the state." (Emphasis added.) One does not question
the need for revenue in Arkansas, but within the limits of this
avowed purpose the majority opinion's discussion of the theory
which permits a stronger regulation of the liquor business than
other businesses is rendered irrelevant. And insofar as the act has
for its purpose a remedy for attendant evils of the liquor trade,
then the availability of alternative remedies-not in conflict with
the constitution - would seem to require the court to examine
9 ibid.
10 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502 ('1934), 89 A. L. R. 1495 (1934).
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closely a measure which grants such special privilege to a select
group of citizens.
The majority opinion refers to Nebbia v. New York" as remov-
ing any federal constitutional issues from the case at bar. Under
the rule of that case, when necessary to the protection of public
.health, minimum prices may be established for retail sales of
milk. On the strength of this precedent it may be contended that
there could be no constitutional bar to minimum price-fixing in a
business involving less wholesome- products possessed of a poten-
tially greater effect upon the public welfare.
In the Nebbia case, however, the complaint was that the statute
violated the equal protection and due process clauses of the Four-
teenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. Nowhere in the
opinions handed down in that case is reference made to a conten-
tion like that propounded in the principal case-that the legisla-
tion was unconstitutional under the state constitution since it con-
ferred a privilege on a certain class which was denied to others.
Moreover, the Nebbia case held that the phrase "affected with a
public interest" is no longer decisive in determining the power of
a state to regulate and set prices in a private business. And this
tends further to erase the distinction made in Gipson v. Morely
between businesses which exist through the permission of the state,
and those of "common right."
. The power of the Legislature, if extensive, is not absolute over
any business, even one which may "be regulated to extinction."
Thus, if the Legislature granted a $1,000 annual bonus to every
person engaged in the liquor trade within the state, the court prob-
ably would have no difficulty in holding such an act unconstitu-
tional as a grant of special privilege, even if it were contended
that such grants were necessary to insure financial stability of
liquor dealers. Such bonus could scarcely be justified as necessary
to protect public welfare. In many respects the statute tested in the
Gipson case is similar to such an outright grant. The legislation
was contested by a citizen and taxpayer, not by a liquor dealer
who was the beneficiary of the special grant; and it was contended
11 Ibid.
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